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Abstract
This Comment argues that the act of state doctrine should not preclude the availability of
mandatory jurisdiction under the penalty wage statute. Part I discusses the penalty wage statute
and the act of state doctrine. Part II presents the factual and the procedural background of the
Tismo decision. Part III argues that the court in Tismo erroneously applied the act of state doctrine
to preclude the court’s mandatory jurisdiction under the penalty wage statute. This Comment
concludes that U.S. courts should retain mandatory jurisdiction over both penalty wage statute
claims and related pendent claims in order to protect the welfare of sailors and the interests of U.S.
port states.
THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE AND MANDATORY
JURISDICTION UNDER THE PENALTY WAGE
STATUTE: TISMO v. M/V IPPOLYTOS
INTRODUCTION
U.S. courts historically have protected sailors as the wards
of admiralty,' thereby safeguarding them from exploitation by
their shipowners.2 In an attempt to protect sailors, the U.S.
Congress enacted the penalty wage statute,3 which penalizes
shipowners for improperly withholding sailors' wages by re-
quiring shipowners to pay sailors two days' wages for each day
1. See Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483-85 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6047)
(holding that sailors are "wards of admiralty," requiring special protection by courts
because they are incapable of caring for themselves and of bargaining with shipown-
ers themselves); see also Arguelles v. U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc., 408 F.2d 1065, 1069
(4th Cir. 1969), aff'd, 400 U.S. 351 (1971). The court in Arguelles stated that "[slince
ancient times seamen have been accorded special protection by their Governments
and Courts, particularly with respect to the prompt payment of wages due them."
Id.; see Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 121 F.2d 336 (2d Cir.) (discussing histori-
cal protection for sailors), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 684 (1941).
2. See Brown v. Lull, 4 F. Cas. 407, 409 (C.C.D. Mass. 1836) (No. 2018) (observ-
ing that sailors' rights need zealous protection by courts because of unequal bargain-
ing position and skill between sailors and shipowners); see also Castillo v. Spiliada
Maritime Corp., 937 F.2d 240, 243 (5th Cir. 1991). The court in Castillo recognized
the ease with which shipowners could exploit sailors, and thus reiterated the reasons
for the special protection accorded them, stating that
[h]istorically, seamen have enjoyed a special status in our judicial system.
They enjoy this status because they occupy a unique position. A seaman
isolated on a ship on the high seas is often vulnerable to the exploitation of
his employer. Moreover, there exists a great inequality in bargaining posi-
tion between large shipowners and unsophisticated seamen. Shipowners
generally control the availability and terms of employment.
Id.
3. Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 6, 1 Stat. 133. The original wage protection
statute was enacted by the first Congress in 1790. Id. The act was amended first in
1872 to include a penalty for the nonpayment of sailor's wages. Shipping Commis-
sioners Act of 1872, ch. 322, § 35, 17 Stat. 269 (1873). It was then amended in 1898
to remove courts' discretion in calculating the penalty and the time limit for which
the penalty was applicable. Act of Dec. 21, 1898, ch. 28, § 4, 30 Stat. 756 (1899).
H.R. REP. No. 1657, 55th Cong., 2d Sess., 2, 3 (1898); S.R. REP. No. 832, 54th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1896). The statute was amended again in 1915 to include the
double wage provision. Seamen's Act of March 4, 1915, ch. 153, § 3, 38 Stat. 1164-
65 (1915). The statute has remained essentially unchanged since the 1915 amend-
ment, and is codified at 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1976) and 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (1988). The
legislative history indicates that the purpose of the statute was to protect sailors.
H.R. REP. No. 852, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1914); H.R. REP. No. 645, 62d Cong.,
2d Sess. 8 (1912); 52 CONG. REC. 4808 (1915) (statement of Senator Vardman); 50
CONG. REC. 5748-49 (1915) (statement of Senator Fletcher).
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of a specified violation.4 Congress, as an additional protection,
provided for mandatory federal subject matter jurisdiction for
these wage claims, provided sailors bring them in good faith.5
Congress specifically considered and approved the application
of this legislation to non-U.S. vessels.6
The U.S. penalty wage statute exemplifies the traditional
protective attitude of admiralty of safeguarding the payment of
sailors.7 Sailors' wage claims have been called "sacred
claims." 8 The courts have taken an aggressive stance in ensur-
ing that sailors receive their payment by granting a lien against
their vessel.' Thus, a sailor can sue to bring an action in rem
against the vessel to secure the payment of wages.'o Protecting
the sailor's right to wage payment, therefore, has consistently
been highly regarded by courts." Moreover, since ancient
4. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(e)-(i) (1988).
5. See, e.g., Abraham v. Universal Glow, Inc., 681 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1982)
(holding that penalty wage statute requires mandatory jurisdiction over claims
brought in good faith); Dutta v. Clan Grahan, 528 F.2d 1258, 1260 (4th Cir. 1975)
(holding that wage claim must be brought in good faith in order to secure subject
matter jurisdiction over case itself and ancillary jurisdiction over other employment
related claims against shipowner).
6. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(i) (1988). The statute states that "[t]his section applies to
a seaman on a foreign vessel when in a harbor of the United States. The courts are
available to the seaman for the enforcement of this section." Id.
7. See MARTINJ. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN, § 12:1, at 424. Norris states that
[i]t has been truly said that the seaman is the ward of the legislature for
perhaps no other class of worker has received from a national legislative
body the protection, care and the degree of solicitude as that given to
merchant seamen. Practically every phase of the seaman's working condi-
tions aboard ship from the time he first ships out as an apprentice or as an
ordinary seaman, to the disposal of his estate at his decease, has been ac-
corded legislative attention. Chief among these are the statutes governing
his wages.
Id. (footnote omitted).
8. The Samuel Little, 221 F. 308, 310 (2d Cir. 1915).
9. The Madonna D'Idra, 1 Dodson Adm. 37, 165 Eng. Reprint 1224 (1811). Sir
William Scott, later Lord Stowell, stated that these claims are "sacred liens, and as
long as a plank remains the sailor is entitled, against all other persons, to the pro-
ceeds, as a security for wages." Id., reprinted in NORRIS, supra note 7, § 12:1, at 425.
10. Shepherd v. Taylor, 30 U.S. 675 (1831); McCall v. U.S. Shipping Bd. Emer-
gency Fleet Corp., 294 F. 989 (D. Wash. 1924); Saylor v. Taylor, 77 F. 476 (4th Cir.
1896); The Acorn, 32 F. 638 (D. Pa. 1887).
11. See NORRIS, supra note 7, § 12:1, at 424-25 (explaining consistent high re-
gard that courts have given to sailors' wage claims). See also Arguelles v. U.S. Bulk
Carriers, Inc., 400 U.S. 351 (1971) (holding that policies of allowing sailors to bring
suit under penalty wage statute outweighed those of other labor legislation, in this
case, the Labor Management Relations Act).
1198 FORDHAMINTERNA TIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 15:1196
times, maritime nations have recognized the need to protect
the right to wage payments and thus included similar provi-
sions in their admiralty codes.' 2
Recently, however, the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey, in Tismo v. M/V Ippolytos,' 3 avoided the
mandatory jurisdiction of the penalty wage statute by applying
the act of state doctrine.' 4 The act of state doctrine provides
that the U.S. courts should decline to rule on the acts of non-
U.S. sovereigns that are taken within their own territories.15 In
Tismo, the court applied the act of state doctrine, holding that a
12. Laws of Hanse Towns, reprinted in 30 F. Cas. 1197. This code states that
"[m]asters shall pay their seamen at three payments, one third when the ship sets sail,
outward bound; one third when she is unloaden, and the other when she is returned
home." Id. art. XXVIII, at 1199. "If a master discharges a seaman during the voy-
age, for no lawful cause given, he is bound to pay him his whole wages, and defray
the charge of his return; but if the mariner desires the master's leave to quit the ship,
he shall be bound to restore all the money he received, and pay his own charges." Id.
art. XLII, at 1200. Laws of Wisbuy, art. III, reprinted in 30 F. Cas. 1189. This code
states that
[a] master may turn off a mariner without any lawful cause given, before he
sets sail, paying him half what he had promised him for the voyage. After he
has set sail, and is gone out of his port, that master who turns off a mariner
without lawful cause given, is obliged to pay him all his wages as much as if
he had performed the voyage.
Id. art III, at 1189-90. Laws of Oleron, arts. XII, XIII, XVIII, XX, reprinted in 30 F.
Cas. 1171, 1177-80. These provisions of the Laws of Oleron reflect concern for the
protection of sailors. Id. Marine Ordinances of Louis XIV, art. X, reprinted in 30 F.
Cas. 1203, 1209. This article of these ordinances states that "[i]f a master dismiss a
mariner without a sufficient cause before the voyage is begun, he must pay him one
third of his wages; and if after the voyage is begun, he shall pay him his whole wages,
together with his charges for returning to the place of his departure." Id. art. X, at
1209.
13. 776 F. Supp. 928 (D.N.J.), aff'd mer., 947 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1991).
14. Id. at 932-35.
15. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,
409 (1990) (holding that courts should only apply act of state doctrine when adjudi-
cating validity of official acts of sovereign taken within sovereign's territory). The
Court defined the act of state doctrine, stating that "[tihe act of state doctrine does
not establish an exception for cases and controversies that may embarrass foreign
governments, but merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign
sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid." Id.; Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250 (1897). Many articles have discussed the act of state doctrine. See, e.g.,
Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 805 (1964); Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The Changing Structure of
International Law, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 810 (1965); Donald W. Hoagland, The Act of State
Doctrine: Abandon It, 14 DENY. J. INr'L L. & POL'Y 317 (1986); Malvina Halberstam,
Sabbatino Resurrected.- The Act of State Doctrine in the Revised Restatement of U.S. Foreign
Relations Law, 79 AMER. J. INr'L L. 68 (1985); Stephen G. Wolfe, Comment, Rational-
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preexisting bilateral agreement between Cyprus and the Phil-
ippines provided for exclusive jurisdiction of the suit in the
country where the employment contracts had been signed."
The court, reluctant to infringe on this jurisdictional provision
of the bilateral agreement, applied the act of state doctrine and
declined to hear the case. 17 The Third Circuit affirmed this
decision without opinion.' 8
This Comment argues that the act of state doctrine should
not preclude the availability of mandatory jurisdiction under
the penalty wage statute. Part I discusses the penalty wage
statute and the act of state doctrine. Part II presents the fac-
tual and the procedural background of the Tismo decision. Part
III argues that the court in Tismo erroneously applied the act of
state doctrine to preclude the court's mandatory jurisdiction
under the penalty wage statute. This Comment concludes that
U.S. courts should retain mandatory jurisdiction over both
penalty wage statute claims and related pendent claims in or-
der to protect the welfare of sailors and the interests of U.S.
port states.
I. THE PENALTY WAGE STATUTE AND THE ACT OF
STATE DOCTRINE
A. The Penalty Wage Statute
The penalty wage statute reflects several legislative pur-
poses that courts seek to enforce. The statute codifies the
traditional concern of giving sailors a cause of action against
shipowners for timely payment of wages.' 9 The statute also at-
izing the Federal Act of State Doctrine and Evolving Judicial Exceptions, 46 FORDHAM L. REV.
295 (1977).
16. Tismo, 776 F. Supp. at 929-35.
17. Id. at 932-35.
18. Tismo v. M/V Ippolytos, 947 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1991). The Third Circuit's
reasoning in affirming this decision and showing a reluctance to afford non-U.S.
sailors the protection afforded by other U.S. labor legislation is paralleled by its deci-
sion in Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping, Inc., 932 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1991). In that case,
however, the labor statute in question, the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), did
not explicitly apply to non-U.S. sailors. Id. Congress, on the other hand, made the
penalty wage statute explicitly applicable to non-U.S. sailors. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(i)
(1988); Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920).
19. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(i) (1988); see also supra note 12 (discussing similar provi-
sions of ancient sea codes that seek to ensure that shipowners and masters pay
sailors).
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tempts to protect U.S. port states from bearing the burden of
caring for impecunious sailors. 20 To further these purposes,
the statute specifically protects sailors aboard non-U.S. vessels
when present in U.S. harbors.2 ' Courts also interpret the stat-
ute to require mandatory jurisdiction over wage claims
brought by non-U.S. sailors, provided that the claims are
brought in good faith. 22
1. The Provisions of the Statute
The penalty wage statute establishes certain requirements
and penalties concerning the payment of wages to sailors. 5
These provisions require that, when a ship enters a U.S. port
to discharge crew or cargo, the sailor is entitled to receive, on
demand, one-half the wages due at that point of the voyage. 4
At the end of the voyage, the sailor must receive the balance of
the wages within twenty-four hours following discharge of the
cargo, or within four days following discharge of the sailor,
whichever is earlier.25 If shipowners fail to make this payment
on discharge, without sufficient cause, they must pay the
sailors two days' wages for each day that payment is delayed.26
20. 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (1988); see Monteiro v. Sociedad Maritima San Nicolas,
S.A., 280 F.2d 568, 574 (2d Cir.) (explaining that purposes behind penalty wage stat-
ute were designed to protect sailors and ports from dangers of sailors' being dis-
charged into ports without money), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 915 (1960); see supra note 3
and accompanying text (explaining legislative history of penalty wage statute).
21. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(i) (1988). The statute states that "[t]his section applies to
a seaman on a foreign vessel when in a harbor of the United States. The courts are
available to the seaman for the enforcement of this section." Id.
22. See Abraham v. Universal Glow, Inc., 681 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1982) (in-
terpreting penalty wage statute to confer mandatory jurisdiction when wage claim
brought in good faith); Dutta v. Clan Grahan, 528 F.2d 1258, 1260 (4th Cir. 1975)
(same).
23. 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (1988).
24. Id. § 10313(e). The statute provides that "[a]fter the beginning of the voy-
age, a seaman is entitled to receive from the master, on demand, one-half of the
balance of wages earned and unpaid at each port at which the vessel loads or delivers
cargo during the voyage." Id.
25. Id. § 10313(f. The statute further provides that "[w]hen a seaman is dis-
charged and final payment of wages is delayed for the period permitted by this sub-
section, the seaman is entitled at the time of discharge to one-third of the wages due
the seaman." Id.
26. Id. § 10313(g). The statute states that "[w]hen payment is not made as pro-
vided under subsection (f) of this section without sufficient cause, the master or the
owner shall pay to the seaman 2 days' wages for each day payment is delayed." Id.;
see, e.g., Collie v. Ferguson, 281 U.S. 52, 56 (1930) (holding that statutory require-
ment of sufficient cause was to prevent "arbitrary refusals to pay wages, and to in-
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Strictly interpreting the punitive nature of the statute, the U.S.
Supreme Court precluded any judicial discretion to modify the
amount of the award. 27
The statute protects all sailors on non-U.S. vessels when
these vessels are present in U.S. harbors.28  The Supreme
Court has interpreted the statute to protect non-U.S. sailors
aboard any ship present in U.S. harbors.2 9 This extension of
the penalty wage statute's protection to non-U.S. sailors fur-
ther benefits U.S. sailors by removing the shipowners' incen-
tive to hire unprotected non-U.S. sailors instead of U.S.
sailors.
duce prompt payment when payment is possible"); Conte v. Flota Mercante Del Es-
tado, 277 F.2d 664, 672 (2d Cir. 1960) (asserting that sufficient cause may be found
where bona fide dispute over amount owed exists); Bender v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
166 F.2d 428 (3d Cir. 1948) (asserting that sufficient cause may be found where pay-
ment withheld in reasonable belief that it was not due); The Thomas Tracy, 24 F.2d
372, 374 (2d Cir.) (holding that sufficient cause may be found where there was honest
error of judgment), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 595 (1928). See supra note 12 and accompa-
nying text (discussing ancient sea codes' similar requirement that if masters dis-
charge sailors without sufficient cause, masters are then liable to sailor for wages for
.entire voyage.)
27. See Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 577 (1982) (holding
that district court had no discretion to alter amount of award by limiting time period
of payment delinquency). In Griffin, the Court penalized the shipowner US$300,000
for failure to pay wages in the amount of US$412.50. Id. at 574-76. The sailor's daily
wage was US$101.20, and the period of delay for the US$412.50 was between the
date of the sailor's discharge, April 1, 1976, and the date of payment, September 17,
1980. Id. at 566-68. The Court therefore required the shipowner to pay twice the
daily wage, US$202.40, for each day in this period of time, resulting in an award of
over US$300,000. Id. at 574-75; see generally Mark S. Dugan, Note, Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors: A Response, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 157 (1983) (explaining Court's decision
and more closely examining damages calculations under statute).
28. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(i) (1988).
29. See Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348, 355 (1920) (interpreting con-
gressional intent to include all U.S. sailors and non-U.S. sailors on non-U.S. vessels
when present in U.S. harbors). The Supreme Court held that Congress intended the
protection of the wage statute to extend to U.S. and non-U.S. sailors alike, noting
that when
taking the provisions of the act as the same are written, we think it plain that
it manifests the purpose of Congress to place American and foreign seamen
on an equality of right in so far as the privileges of this section are con-
cerned, with equal opportunity to resort to the courts of the United States
for the enforcement of the act.
Id.
30. See id. at 355 (holding that purpose of statute of aiding U.S. sailors would be
undermined if statute did not apply to non-U.S. sailors because shipowners would
not employ protected U.S. sailors); Monteiro v. Sociedad Maritima San Nicolas, S.A.,
280 F.2d 568, 574 (2d Cir.) (explaining that intent of Congress was to help U.S.
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2. Mandatory U.S. Federal Jurisdiction Under the Statute
Federal jurisdiction over wage claims asserted under the
statute is mandatory, provided that the plaintiff-sailor shows
that the claim is brought in good faith. 3' In view of the con-
gressional intent to grant non-U.S. sailors access to the U.S.
courts for these claims, courts enjoy wide latitude in determin-
ing the good faith of wage claims.3 2 Courts review the merits
of the claims to assess their good faith, and may determine that
the plaintiff-sailors brought the claims in good faith even if the
claims are weak. 33 A judicial determination of the good faith
nature of these claims is subject to reversal only if clearly erro-
neous.
3 4
Once the court grants subject matter jurisdiction over the
penalty wage claim, plaintiffs may introduce other employment
related claims.35 Absent special circumstances, the courts gen-
sailors find work by making wage statute provisions apply to non-U.S. sailors as well),
cert. denied, 364 U.S. 915 (1960).
31. See Abraham v. Universal Glow, Inc., 681 F.2d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1982)
(holding that jurisdiction over wage claim made in good faith is mandatory); see also
46 U.S.C. § 10313(i) (1988) (granting access to U.S. courts to sailors on non-U.S
vessels).
32. Abraham, 682 F.2d at 453.
33. See, e.g., Dutta v. Clan Grahan, 528 F.2d 1258, 1260 (4th Cir. 1975) (holding
that weakness of wage claims not sufficient to establish lack of good faith). The court
stated that "[a] claim may be asserted in good faith even though it ultimately may be
found to be unmeritorious." Id.; see Morewitz v. Andros Compania Maritima, S.A.,
614 F.2d 379, 382 n.4 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that measuring weakness of claim aids
determination of good faith). The Morewitz court stated that
[i]n the present context, the use of "good faith", a term associated with
presence or absence of proper motive, may not seem apt when the resolu-
tion is in terms of whether the claim is one which will succeed or not....
Nevertheless, in the circumstances, prognostication as to probable success
or lack of success of the action is a surer technique for assessing good faith
than any other.
Id.; see Vlachos v. M/VProso, 637 F. Supp. 1354, 1358 (D. Md. 1986) (holding that
based on Morewitz and Dutta tests for good faith, court must answer "not whether
plaintiff's claims are weak, but whether there is no way-or just about no way-in
which they may succeed").
34. See Morewitz, 614 F.2d at 381-82 (holding that finding of good faith was fac-
tual question that would not be reversed unless clearly erroneous).
35. See Dutta, 528 F.2d at 1260. The court stated that "if the court possesses
jurisdiction over the wage claim, 'the general rule in this circuit is that the entire case
should be disposed of on the merits ... even though the court might otherwise de-
cline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining claims.' " Id. (quoting Bekris v.
Greek M/VAristoteles, 437 F.2d 219, 220 (4th Cir. 1971)); see Hernandez v. Naviera
Mercante, C.A., 716 F. Supp. 939, 940-41 (E.D. La. 1989) (stating that ifjurisdiction
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erally will adjudicate these claims as well.36 Thus, plaintiffs can
invoke the penalty wage statute to establish U.S. federal juris-
diction over their pendent claims.3 7 The penalty wage statute
is therefore an especially valuable means for non-U.S. plain-
tiffs, whose pendent claims might otherwise be precluded by
forum non conveniens considerations, to ensure that jurisdiction
will be granted in a U.S. federal court .3  The potential for
abuse in extending the mandatory jurisdiction by the penalty
wage statute to other employment related claims underscores
the need for the requirement of good faith.3 9  The motive,
however, of asserting a wage claim just to obtain jurisdiction
over wage claim is present, court is required to entertain personal injury claims in
suit and dispose of entire case on merits).
36. See Dutta, 528 F.2d at 1260 (holding that such special circumstances include
contacts with United States, location of injury, location of treatment, location and
language of medical records and physicians, and location of counsel); see also Vlachos,
637 F. Supp. at 1361 (adding to these factors likelihood of alternative forum available
to hear suit). But see Dutta, 528 F.2d at 1261 (Widener, J., dissenting) (dissenting over
location of counsel factor).
37. Abraham v. Universal Glow, Inc. 681 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1982). The plaintiff-
sailor avoided dismissal of the personal injury claim by amending the complaint to
include a penalty wage claim. Id. at 452-53.
38. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(i) (1988). The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (the "Jones
Act") provides for personal injury, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure
claims. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988). It is disputed whether U.S. federal jurisdiction
under this statute is mandatory or subject to forum non conveniens considerations.
Timothy O'Shea, Note, The Jones Act's Specific Venue Provision: Does It Preclude Forum
Non Conveniens Dismissal?, 14 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 696 (1990-1991). Several cases,
however, have posited factors to determine whether an action under the Jones Act
will be dismissed for forum non conveniens reasons. See, e.g., Dorizos v. Lemos and
Pateras, Ltd., 437 F. Supp. 120, 122-23 (S.D. Ala. 1977) (explaining factors to deter-
mine choice of law issues andforum non conveniens issues); see also Hellenic Lines Ltd. v.
Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (each discussing factors used in determining
appropriateness of U.S. federal jurisdiction over Jones Act claims). A discussion of
these factors is beyond the scope of this Comment.
39. See, e.g., Dorizos, 437 F. Supp. at 123 (reiterating importance of requirement
of good faith in bringing wage claim). The court stated that
[a] contrary interpretation would subject the act to grave abuse. For in-
stance, it would take a particularly dull attorney not to be able to find at least
some basis for a wage claim, however tenuous, and tack to that claim a
prayer for compensation for personal injuries sounding in negligence, un-
seaworthiness, and maintenance and cure.
Id. (quoting Mihalinos v. Liberian S.S. Trikala, 342 F. Supp. 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1972)).
Due to this potential for abuse, the courts must first determine the issue of good
faith. Dorizos, 437 F. Supp. at 123. If the court finds that the plaintiff-sailor makes the
wage claim without good faith and is merely bringing a frivolous wage claim to estab-
lish jurisdiction, the court can dismiss the case. Id.
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over other claims does not necessarily constitute bad faith on
the part of the plaintiff.4
0
3. U.S. Courts Have Rejected All Attempts to Avoid
Mandatory Jurisdiction
To protect sailors' rights, courts generally reject chal-
lenges to the statute's mandatory jurisdiction.4 ' Shipowners
thus have been unable to avoid mandatory jurisdiction through
utilization of forum selection clauses in the sailors' employ-
ment contracts, 42 assertions of jurisdiction by non-U.S. labor
agencies, 43 releases of wage claims from the sailors, 44 or asser-
tions of the foreign sovereign immunity defense when the ship-
owner is a sovereign.45 Courts have granted jurisdiction even
when the plaintiff has failed to follow mandatory grievance
procedures in collective bargaining agreements made by the
sailors' unions or representatives. 46 The Supreme Court has
also protected sailors from contracting away their rights to
personal injury remedies.4 7
40. See Abraham, 681 F.2d at 452. In Abraham, the plaintiffs' original complaint
had asserted various tort claims. It was amended, however, to include a penalty wage
claim in an attempt to retain U.S. jurisdiction after the tort andJones Act claims were
dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. Id. The court found that the wage claims
were not necessarily brought in bad faith and remanded for a determination of
whether the claims were brought in good faith. Id. But see Dorizos, 437 F. Supp. at 124
(commenting, in dicta, that it would view such motive for wage claim as "unprofes-
sional manner in an effort to require jurisdiction"); Mihalinos, 342 F. Supp. at 1242-
43 (commenting that absence of evidence for wage claim precludes good faith). The
Mihalinos court posited as an example of the potential abuse that this mandatory ju-
risdiction can invite because the value of the wage claim of US$125 was minuscule
compared to value of the personal injury claim of US$36,500. Id. at 1243 nn.7-8.
41. See, e.g., Abraham, 681 F.2d at 453; Dutta v. Clan Grahan, 528 F.2d 1258, 1261
(4th Cir. 1975).
42. Castillo v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 937 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1991).
43. Jose v. M/V Fir Grove, 765 F. Supp. 1024, 1027 (D. Or.), later proceeding, 765
F. Supp. 1037 (D. Or. 1991).
44. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(e) (1988). The statute states that "a court having juris-
diction may set aside, for good cause shown, the release and take action that justice
requires." Id. See Castillo, 937 F.2d at 245 (setting aside release of wage claim ob-
tained in Philippines through coercion, duress, and unfair treatment by defendant-
shipowners).
45. Velidor v. L/P/G Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 455
U.S. 929 (1982).
46. Vlachos v. M/VProso, 637 F. Supp. 1354, 1360 (D. Md. 1986); Arguelles v.
U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc., 408 F.2d 1065, 1069 (4th Cir. 1969), aff'd, 400 U.S. 351
(1971).
47. Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932).
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Courts have rejected the use of forum selection clauses as
a means of avoiding the jurisdiction of the penalty wage stat-
ute.48 Unwilling to allow sailors to contract away their right to
bring wage claims in the United States, courts have held that
these clauses, asserting that wage claims will be adjudicated in
a non-U.S. forum, cannot supersede U.S. federal jurisdiction. 49
Courts will, however, defer to the forum selection clause for
any underlying claims if the wage claim is dismissed for insuffi-
ciency or lack of good faith.50
Courts have also rejected assertions by non-U.S. labor
agencies that these agencies possess exclusive jurisdiction over
wage claims. 5' Although these agencies often assert that they
have exclusive jurisdiction, based on either their national law
or the forum selection clauses in the sailors' contracts, U.S.
courts have retained jurisdiction by applying the penalty wage
statute. 2 U.S. courts have rejected these agencies' claims of
exclusive jurisdiction, though the agencies may have jurisdic-
tion concurrent with U.S. courts.53 In similar labor disputes
48. See, e.g., Castillo v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 732 F. Supp. 50, 52 (E.D. La.)
(stating that mandatory jurisdiction under penalty wage statute would be defeated if
parties could contract around it), summ. judgment granted, 740 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. La.
1990), rev'd, 937 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1991); Galon v. M/VHira H, 1990 A.M.C. 344
(W.D. Wa. 1989) (holding that forum selection clause within sailor's employment
contract could not contravene mandatory U.S. federal jurisdiction over wage claims);
Arguelles, 408 F.2d at 1071-72 (holding that collective bargaining procedure in con-
tract was not mandatory alternative to seeking redress pursuant to wage statute).
49. See Arguelles, 408 F.2d at 1071 (holding that penalty wage statute, enacted to
aid sailors, should not be nullified or circumvented by private agreements).
50. Dorizos v. Lemos and Pateras, Ltd., 437 F. Supp. 120, 121-22 (S.D. Ala.
1977) (holding that forum selection clauses in admiralty law are " 'prima facie valid
and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be
unreasonable under the circumstances' ") (quoting MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 7 (1972)).
51. Jose v. M/V Fir Grove, 765 F. Supp. 1024, 1027 (D. Or.) (recognizing that
though Philippine labor code provided for exclusive jurisdiction in Philippines for
wage disputes, provision did not supersede U.S. federal jurisdiction), later proceeding,
765 F. Supp. 1037 (D. Or. 1991).
52. See Castillo, 732 F. Supp. at 51 (explaining that although employment con-
tracts granted original and exclusive jurisdiction to Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency and Philippine Court ofJustice, U.S. federal courts should retain jurisdiction
in order to guarantee that sailors' rights are upheld), summ. judgment granted, 740 F.
Supp. 409 (E.D. La. 1990) (on issue of validity of contractual releases), rev'd, 937 F.2d
240 (5th Cir. 1991) (on issue of validity of contractual releases).
53. See, e.g. ,Jose, 765 F. Supp. at 1027 (explaining that though sailors could elect
to bring suit in Philippine forum, this option does not deprive United States ofjuris-
diction); see The Estrella, 102 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1938) (allowing Norwegian consul to
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involving U.S. workers outside the United States, two U.S.
courts have rejected assertions of exclusive jurisdiction by
other nations' labor agencies when these assertions were based
on the act of state doctrine.54
Under the penalty wage statute, courts may also set aside a
contractual release of a wage claim if the release is not in the
interests of justice.5 5 Recognizing the sailors' poor bargaining
position and the general policy of protecting sailors from ex-
ploitation by the shipowners, courts closely scrutinize contrac-
tual releases of sailors' wage claims.56 Courts may find, how-
ever, that a plaintiff's previous execution of a release of a wage
claim is valid, thus precluding the required jurisdictional ele-
ment of good faith.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has also
rejected an attempt by a non-U.S. sovereign shipowner to util-
ize the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA")58 to avoid
the mandatory jurisdiction of the penalty wage statute.59
Although the FSIA normally grants non-U.S. sovereigns im-
munity from suit in U.S. courts,6" the FSIA contains a commer-
have concurrent jurisdiction over case because of treaty between United States and
Norway); but see Lascoratos v. SIT Olympic Flame, 227 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1964)
(asserting that modern view is to assert mandatory jurisdiction and not to defer to
non-U.S. authority).
54. Randall v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., 778 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1985) (refusing to
allow law of non-U.S. state to deprive U.S. courts of jurisdiction). The court held
that only the Constitution and the laws of the United States could mandate the cases
the U.S. federal courts could hear. Id. at 1149-50. Therefore, the court held that its
refusal to honor the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of non-U.S. sovereign's law did
not violate the act of state doctrine. Id. at 1153. Accord Veitz v. Unisys Corp., 676 F.
Supp. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1987).
55. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(e) (1988). The statute states that "[n]otwithstanding a
release signed by a seaman under section 10312 of this title, a court having jurisdic-
tion may set aside, for good cause shown, the release and take action that justice
requires." Id.
56. Castillo v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 937 F.2d 240, 244 (5th Cir. 1991); Wink
v. Rowan Drilling Co., 611 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980).
57. Castillo, 937 F.2d at 244; see Morewitz v. Andros Campania Maritima, S.A.,
614 F.2d 379, 382 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that release executed without duress,
fraud, or unseemly conduct pretermits good faith wage claim).
58. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
59. Velidor v. LIPIG Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 455
U.S. 929 (1982).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. The statute states that "[slubject to existing international
agreements to which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a
foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter." Id.
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cial activity exception under which courts may deny immunity
to defendant sovereign shipowners.6 t Under the commercial
activity exception, a non-U.S. sovereign or governmental
agency is open to suit in the United States if the plaintiff's
claim relates to certain commercial activities of the sover-
eign.6 2  According to the legislative history of the FSIA,
merchant shipping by a non-U.S. sovereign constitutes one ex-
ample of such a commercial activity.63 The court held that
when the wage claim arises from circumstances involving the
use of a U.S. harbor by a non-U.S merchant ship, a sufficient
nexus or relation exists between the claim and the shipowners'
commercial activity to satisfy the commercial activity exception
of the FSIA. 4 The court therefore upheld mandatory jurisdic-
tion over penalty wage claims, rejecting the sovereign immu-
nity defense under the commercial activity exception to the
FSIA.65
Courts also permit mandatory jurisdiction over penalty
wage claims for plaintiff-sailors before they utilize grievance
procedures of collective bargaining agreements. ° Indeed,
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988). The commercial activity exception states that
courts will deny sovereign immunity in cases
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act
causes a direct effect in the United States.
Id.; see Velidor, 653 F.2d at 819-20 (holding that commercial activity exception to FSIA
applies when wage claim arises on vessel owned by non-U.S. sovereign using U.S.
harbor).
62. Velidor, 653 F.2d at 820.
63. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604 (listing operation of merchant shipping by sovereign as commercial enterprise
for purposes of FSIA).
64. Velidor v. LIPIG Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding re-
quired nexus solely because ship owned by non-U.S. sovereign sailed into U.S. port),
cert. dismissed, 455 U.S. 929 (1982).
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Vlachos v. M/V Proso, 637 F. Supp. 1354, 1360 n.8 (D. Md. 1986)
(asserting that failure to follow collective bargaining procedures does not preclude
good faith in bringing wage claim); see also Arguelles v. U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc., 408
F.2d 1065, 1071 (4th Cir. 1969), aff'd, 400 U.S. 351 (1971). The Arguelles court called
the collective bargaining agreement an
additional mode of redress for such seaman and which he may pursue, at his
election.... To construe the grievance procedure as a mandatory substitute
for the seaman's statutory right to prompt payment of his wages is, in our
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courts have allowed sailors to sue for wage rates mandated by
their collective bargaining agreement even though the sailors
did not adhere to the grievance procedures established in the
same collective bargaining agreement. 67 By allowing sailors to
bypass grievance procedures, courts illustrate their desire to
prevent the sailors' unions from bargaining away the sailors'
right to U.S. jurisdiction.68
Tismo is the first U.S. decision to deny jurisdiction under
the penalty wage statute on the basis of the act of state doc-
trine. This is also the first case involving a bilateral agreement
between two non-U.S. sovereigns that purports to deprive the
U.S. courts of mandatory jurisdiction under the penalty wage
statute by means of an original and exclusive jurisdiction pro-
vision. Only recently, therefore, has a court deferred jurisdic-
tion under this statute to a non-U.S. forum on the basis of the
act of state doctrine. 69
B. The Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine is a common law doctrine by
which U.S. courts decline to adjudicate claims that require rul-
ing on the validity of governmental actions taken by non-U.S.
sovereigns within their own territories.7" Early U.S. cases de-
opinion, palpable error. Statutes enacted out of considerations of public
policy, such as section 596 pertaining to seaman's wages, should not and
cannot be nullified or circumvented by private agreement.
Id. § 596 is the equivalent version of the current § 10313. 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (1988).
67. Arguelles, 408 F.2d at 1070-71.
68. Id.
69. Tismo v. M/V Ippolytos, 776 F. Supp. 928 (D.Nj.), aff'd mem., 947 F.2d 937
(3d Cir. 1991).
70. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). In Underhill, the Court
pronounced the basic formulation of the act of state doctrine:
[e]very sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Re-
dress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the
means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Id.; see JOSEPH MODESTE SWEENEY, ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 383
(1988) (explaining rationale of act of state doctrine). The authors explained the ra-
tionale of the act of state doctrine, stating that
if the foreign rule stems from an exercise of sovereignty by the foreign state,
such as an act of governance, and the plaintiff is seeking to attack the funda-
mental validity of that conduct by the foreign state, the forum judge will
become more cautious and may hesitate or refuse to examine the act of the
foreign state.
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cided under the act of state doctrine applied the principle of
sovereign immunity.7 The U.S. Supreme Court extended im-
munity to individuals who acted as agents of governmental au-
thority in performing official acts within their own territory. 2
Courts now, however, rely on a constitutional separation of
powers rationale.7" On the basis of this separation of powers
reasoning, U.S. courts refrain from adjudicating cases that
might interfere with the foreign relations prerogatives of the
executive branch. 74  By preventing courts from examining
these acts of non-U.S. sovereigns, however, the act of state
doctrine validates official acts of non-U.S. sovereigns per-
formed within their territory as rules of decision for the U.S.
courts.7 5
1. Kirkpatrick and Sabbatino: The Modern
Act of State Doctrine
U.S. courts apply a two-step approach when considering
Id.
71. See, e.g., Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.
72. Id. at 252. The Court refused to adjudicate the case, basing its decision on
the principle that individuals acting in the scope of their authority within their state's
territory cannot be judged in foreign tribunals. Id. The Court stated that
[n]or can the principle be confined to lawful or recognized governments, or
to cases where redress can manifestly be had through public channels. The
immunity of individuals from suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts done
within their own states, in the exercise of governmental authority, whether
as civil officers or as military commanders, must necessarily extend to the
agents of governments ruling by paramount force as matter of fact.
Id.
73. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (holding that
act of state doctrine rests on separation of powers rationale wherein judicial branch
declines to adjudicate validity of act of non-U.S. sovereign taken within its own terri-
tory); but see Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252 (stating that court will not entertain suit against
official of non-U.S. sovereign state); see also Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S.
297 (1918); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., Ltd., 246 U.S. 304 (1918) (presenting
similar situations wherein the Court refused to adjudicate expropriations performed
by Mexican military officials during a Mexican revolution). See Wolfe, supra note 15,
at 304 (commenting that early basis of sovereign immunity has given way to separa-
tion of powers rationale due to restrictions on sovereign immunity of states).
74. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-29; see generally Mark D. Pethke, Recent Decision,
22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1231, 1235 (1989). Mr. Pethke comments that the mod-
ern formulation of the act of state doctrine is based on reluctance to adjudicate mat-
ters involving foreign affairs. Id. at 1235 n.32.
75. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 409
(1990). Justice Scalia held that the act of state doctrine provides that official acts of
non-U.S. sovereigns performed within their own territory are to be "deemed valid"
by U.S. courts when deciding a case involving one. Id.
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application of the act of state doctrine. To apply the doctrine,
courts first must determine that the case at issue meets the
threshold requirement of the doctrine. The case must directly
place into question the validity of an official act by a non-U.S.
sovereign that was taken within the sovereign's territory. Once
this threshold requirement is established, courts must then ap-
ply a balancing test that weighs several factors to determine
the propriety of applying the act of state doctrine.
The Supreme Court enunciated this threshold require-
ment of the act of state doctrine in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v.
Environmental Tectonics Corp.76 The Court held that it could not
apply the act of state doctrine in order to avoid the court's in-
quiry into allegations that the defendant had bribed a Nigerian
official in order to obtain a valuable government contract.77
Refusing to apply the act of state doctrine, the court held that
it was proper for a U.S. court to adjudicate the case because
the validity of the official act of the Nigerian sovereign, the ex-
ecution of the contract, was not in issue.7" The Court held that
any potential embarrassment ensuing from the Court's inquiry
into the motivations of the Nigerian official was insufficient to
implicate the act of state doctrine. 79
The establishment of the threshold requirement led the
Court to restrict the act of state doctrine by mandating that
courts may not refuse to hear cases merely to avoid embarrass-
ment to the sovereigns or inquiry into the motivation for the
sovereigns' acts.8 0 Courts may only refuse to hear cases under
the doctrine if the adjudication of the case requires a ruling on
the validity of an official act of the non-U.S. sovereign taken
within its own territory.8' Thus, if a case merely contains polit-
76. Id. at 409-10 (holding that technical availability of act of state doctrine is met
when act of non-U.S sovereign taken within its own territory is at issue before court).
See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1025-27 (6th Cir. 1990) (commenting
that Kirkpatrick posited threshold requirement for act of state doctrine).
77. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 406.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 408-10.
80. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,
408-10 (1990); see also Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528, 1531-32 (11 th Cir.
1991) (commenting that Kirkpatrick indicates restrictive attitude toward applying act
of state doctrine).
81. See Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989) (refusing
to apply act of state doctrine to suit involving Republic of China's order to assassi-
nate man in U.S. territory). Cf Grupo Protexa, S.A. v. All American Marine Slip, 954
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ically sensitive issues or may embarrass a non-U.S. sovereign,
but does not require the court to adjudicate the validity of an
official act of a non-U.S. sovereign taken within its own terri-
tory, the court may not apply the act of state doctrine.82 Once
the threshold requirement is satisfied, courts should balance
several factors to determine whether to apply the act of state
doctrine.83
The Supreme Court set forth these factors in its modern
formulation of the act of state doctrine in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino."4 In Sabbatino, the Cuban government sued a
court-appointed receiver in U.S. federal court to recover prof-
its made by a U.S. sugar company from assets that had been
taken out of Cuba after Cuba had nationalized the company's
assets.85 The Supreme Court, applying the act of state doc-
trine, declined to adjudicate the validity of Cuba's expropria-
tion of the sugar company's assets.86 The Court based its deci-
sion primarily on its desire to avoid potential conflict with the
U.S. executive's foreign relations powers.8 7
The Court formulated several factors that courts should
balance when considering application of the act of state doc-
trine.88 First, courts should consider the degree of codification
or consensus concerning the particular area of law around
F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1992) (declining to decide whether act of state doctrine precluded
court from adjudicating issue where Mexican official acted in reference to wreck of
ship that had sunk outside territorial waters of Mexico).
82. Kirkpatrick, 493 U.S. at 408-10. The Court states that "[t]he act of state doc-
trine does not establish an exception for cases and controversies that may embarrass
foreign governments, but merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of
foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid." Id. at
409.
83. Id. at 409. The Court, in emphasizing that the threshold requirement of the
act of state doctrine must be met before the policies underlying the act of state doc-
trine can be evaluated, stated that "[it is one thing to suggest, as we have, that the
policies underlying the act of state doctrine should be considered in deciding
whether, despite the doctrine's technical availability, it should nonetheless not be
invoked." Id.
84. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 427-39.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 427-29. These factors highlighted the separation of powers rationale.
Id. The Court stated that the act of state doctrine's "continuing vitality depends on
its capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and
political branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs." Id. at
427-28.
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which the dispute centers.8 9 The greater the codification or
consensus, the greater the justification for the court to adjudi-
cate the case.90 Second, courts should analyze the sensitivity of
the issue to the executive's foreign relations policies.9 The
more sensitive the issue is to the current foreign affairs situa-
tion, the greater the justification for the court to defer to the
executive and decline to adjudicate the case.92 Third, the
court should consider the continued existence of the non-U.S.
state whose acts are in question.93 If the government that per-
formed the act is defunct, the political implications of hearing
the case will be less significant.94 In Sabbatino, the decision to
apply the act of state doctrine evinced that the second factor,
that of the sensitivity of the matter to the executive's foreign
relations, weighed more heavily than the other factors.9 5 The
Sabbatino factors thus require a flexible balancing approach for
courts to determine whether to apply the act of state doc-
89. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). The Court
asserted that when the international law governing the issue clearly defines the prin-
ciples to be applied, the "more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions
regarding it." Id. The Court would not be interfering with the executive's formula-
tion of such sensitive principles by adjudicating such a case. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 428. The Court stated that courts should gauge the importance of the
issue to the executive's foreign relations policies when deciding whether to apply the
doctrine. Id. The Court stated that "[it is also evident that some aspects of interna-
tional law touch much more sharply on national nerves than do others; the less im-
portant the implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justi-
fication for exclusivity in the political branches." Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 428. The Court commented that if the non-U.S. sovereign that per-
formed the act in question is no longer in existence, for example, Nazi Germany, the
foreign policy implications of adjudicating such an act would probably be weaker
than if the country was viable. Id. The Court stated that "[t]he balance of relevant
considerations may also be shifted if the government which perpetrated the chal-
lenged act of state is no longer in existence . . . for the political interest of this
country may, as a result, be measurably altered." Id.
94. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
95. See id. at 428-32. Again, the Court emphasized that it wanted to avoid con-
flict with the executive branch, holding that
[c]onsiderably more serious and far-reaching consequences would flow from
a judicial finding that international law standards had been met if that deter-
mination flew in the face of a State Department proclamation to the con-
trary .... In short, whatever way the matter is cut, the possibility of conflict
between the Judicial and Executive Branches could hardly be avoided.
Id. at 432-33; see Pethke, supra note 74, at 1238 (commenting that preeminence of
factor of interference with executive is understandable under separation of powers
rationale).
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96trine.
2. Exceptions to the Act of State Doctrine
Several criticisms of the act of state doctrine have arisen,
leading to the promulgation of exceptions to the doctrine.
One criticism is that the act of state doctrine effectively vali-
dates the actions of non-U.S. sovereigns by preventing redress
for such actions in U.S. courts.9 7 Similarly, by applying the
doctrine, the U.S. courts may be said to ratify actions that
might contravene international law.98 A final criticism is that
application of the doctrine may prevent U.S. courts from per-
forming their constitutional duty of dispensing justice and
from contributing to the development of international law.99
96. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. The Court stated that it was not "laying down or
reaffirming an inflexible and all-encompassing rule in this case." Id.; see Pethke, supra
note 74, at 1237 (commenting that Court advocated "flexible, case-by-case balancing
approach" for determining application of act of state doctrine).
97. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1988). Congress
displayed its dissatisfaction with the Sabbatino decision by enacting the second Hick-
enlooper Amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act [hereinafter "Hickenlooper II"].
Id. Through Hickenlooper II, Congress voiced its concern that the act of state doc-
trine would prevent courts from serving justice by validating expropriation of U.S.
property by non-U.S. governments in violation of international law. Id. Congress,
specifically limiting Hickenlooper II to situations involving an expropriation of prop-
erty in violation of international law, thus provided that the court could apply the act
of state doctrine in such cases if the executive informed the court that adjudicating
the case would impede the executive's foreign relations policies. Id.
98. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting). Justice White stated that
I am dismayed that the court has, with one broad stroke, declared the ascer-
tainment and application of international law beyond the competence of
courts of the United States in a large and important category of cases. I am
also disappointed in the court's declaration that the acts of a sovereign state
with regard to the property of aliens within its borders are beyond the reach
of international law in the courts of this country. However clearly estab-
lished that law may be, a sovereign may violate it with impunity, except inso-
far as the political branches of the government may provide a remedy. This
backward-looking doctrine, never before declared in the Court, is carried a
disconcerting step further: not only are the courts powerless to question
acts of state proscribed by international law but they are likewise powerless
to refuse to adjudicate the claim founded upon a foreign law; they must
render judgment and thereby validate the lawless act.
Id. (White, J., dissenting).
99. See id. at 450-57; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Constitution states
that
[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
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These problems have led both the Supreme Court and
lower courts to fashion exceptions allowing courts to adjudi-
cate cases that otherwise would fall under the act of state doc-
trine.100 Though they have been used in varying degrees by
the lower courts, the Supreme Court has never explicitly
adopted these exceptions.' 0 ' These exceptions to the act of
state doctrine include the Bernstein exception, the treaty excep-
tion, the commercial activity exception, and the extraterritorial
exception. 0 2
a. The Bernstein Exception
The Bernstein exception compels courts to adjudicate cases
when the executive branch affirmatively notifies the court that
deciding such cases will not interfere with foreign relations.1
0 3
which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassa-
dors, other public Ministers and consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction;-to controversies to which the United States shall be
a party;-to controversies between two or more States;-between a State
and Citizens of another State;-between citizens of different States;-be-
tween Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under the Grants of differ-
ent States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens, and Subjects.
Id. Justice White asserted that by not adjudicating these cases on the merits, courts
do not fulfil their responsibility under the U.S. Constitution. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at
450-57. International law is part of U.S. law, and courts have the obligation to ascer-
tain and administer it in appropriate cases. See e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677, 700 (1900) (holding that "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determina-
tion"); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (emphasizing that judicial tribunals
must adjudicate cases involving international law, whether they use treaties, statutes,
or customary international law principles).
100. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400
(1990). The Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to evaluate these excep-
tions to the act of state doctrine, but declined to do so because it held that the doc-
trine did not apply. Id. at 405.
101. Id.
102. See infra notes 103-118 and accompanying text (describing relevant excep-
tions of act of state doctrine).
103. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme ("Bernstein I"), 163
F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). Bernstein I involved the adjudica-
tion of a taking of property by the Nazi government. Id. When suit was brought to
recover the proceeds of this property, Judge Learned Hand ruled that the act of state
doctrine shielded the validity of the expropriation from adjudication unless the exec-
utive branch affirmatively notified the court that it could hear the case. Id.; but see
Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvarrt-Maatschappij ("Bern-
stein II"), 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954) (allowing adjudication of case because State
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The Supreme Court did not approve this exception.' °4 Courts
still consider letters from the executive branch as strong evi-
dence of the political sensitivity of the case.' 05 Courts, there-
fore, continue to consider executive branch recommendations
in weighing the Sabbatino factors, though they are not bound by
them.
b. The Treaty Exception
Under the treaty exception, the act of state doctrine does
not apply when a treaty or international agreement clearly out-
lines the controlling legal standards that the court should em-
ploy to adjudicate the case at issue.'0 6 When a treaty clearly
addresses the issues in question adjudication using the stan-
dards of the treaty or agreement should neither embarrass the
executive nor conflict with its foreign policy, because the treaty
already represents the U.S. interpretation of international
law. 10 7 Although never explicitly decided by the Supreme
Department sent letter to court advising that executive saw no interference with for-
eign relations if court heard case). Id. In Bernstein H, the Court stressed the evil
nature of the German confiscation. Id.
104. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
Three Justices in the plurality opinion adopted the Bernstein exception in First Nat '
City Bank, 406 U.S. at 760-70, but two concurring justices and four dissenting justices
rejected it. Id. at 770-73 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 773-76 (Powell, J., concur-
ring); id. at 776-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The facts of First Nat'l City Bank were
similar to Sabbatino because they both involved a Cuban expropriation. Id.; Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In First Nat'1 City Bank, how-
ever, the executive branch affirmatively notified the court that adjudicating the case
would not hinder foreign relations and therefore asked the court to adjudicate the
case and thereby to affirm the Bernstein exception. First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. at
762-70. Four dissenting and two concurring Justices, however, rejected the Bernstein
exception, averring that it constituted unwarranted executive interference with the
judiciary. Id. at 776-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 519-
23 (2d Cir.) (reviewing its earlier position in light of executive branch's newly ex-
pressed position on case), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985); Texas Trading and
Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 316 n.38 (2d Cir. 1981)
(listing executive's stated position on matter as factor in determining whether to ap-
ply act of state doctrine), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
106. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (hold-
ing that judiciary will not adjudicate taking of property within sovereign's own terri-
tory if sovereign government is "extant and recognized by this country at the time of
suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding control-
ling legal principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary
international law").
107. See, e.g., Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov. of So-
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Court, this exception follows from the Court's language in Sab-
batino, in which the Court expressed reluctance to adjudicate a
case in part due to the lack of clear international law on the
issue.' 0 8 The Supreme Court, however, has given courts no
guidance in determining whether a treaty's provisions contain
controlling legal principles, thus leaving the validity and appli-
cation of the exception unclear. 0 9
c. The Commercial Activity Exception
In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,1 0 a plu-
rality of the Supreme Court articulated the commercial activity
exception, granting an exception to the act of state doctrine
when the sovereign engages in purely commercial activity."'
l
In Dunhill, the Court held that Cuba, which had nationalized its
cialist Eth., 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984) (commenting on additional materials that
serve as guidelines for the interpretation for such treaties); see also Eric. L. Schwim-
mer, Note, A Treaty Exception to the Act of State Doctrine: A Framework for Judicial Applica-
tion, 4 B.U. INT'L L.J. 201, 212 (1986). The author stated that the treaty gives the
court the applicable law on which to adjudicate the case, because
[w]here a breach of a treaty is alleged, it is unnecessary for a court to defer
to the executive. In the treaty, the executive has already established the
foreign policy position of the United States and articulated the United States
interpretation of international law. Since the executive has not given its
views on the issue in the treaty or executive agreement, the court would not
be interfering with the executive branch by adjudicating the case. As men-
tioned above, however, the Supreme Court has not yet decided a case on
this treaty exception and thus its formula for application is not clear.
Id.
108. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428 (holding that such treaty would provide suffi-
cient legal principles to adjudicate case); see, e.g., Kalamazoo Spice, 729 F.2d at 427-28.
109. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. The issue of determining whether a treaty or
agreement contains unambiguous and controlling legal principles is not settled. See,
e.g., Ethiopian Spice Extraction Share Co. v. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., 543 F.
Supp. 1224 (W.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd sub nom., Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v.
Provisional Military Gov. of Socialist Eth., 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984). The district
court held that the phrase "prompt, adequate, and effective compensation" was am-
biguous and could not be used by the court to determine the appropriate compensa-
tion for this matter. Id. at 1227. The Sixth Circuit, however, held that the phrase was
unambiguous when interpreted according to the friendship, commerce and naviga-
tion treaties, prior U.S. case law, and amicus curiae briefs filed by the Departments of
State, Treasury andJustice. Kalamazoo Spice, 729 F.2d at 426-29. These briefs argued
that the 1953 Treaty of Amity between the United States and Ethiopia contained
controlling legal principles on which the case should be adjudicated. Id.
110. 425 U.S. 682 (1976). Four justices adopted this commercial activity excep-
tion, and therefore this exception has not been accepted by a majority of the
Supreme Court. Id.
11. Id.
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cigar industry, could not claim the act of state doctrine as a
defense for its repudiation of debts because this debt repudia-
tion was a commercial, not a governmental activity." l2 When
using the commercial activity exception, courts do not contra-
vene the act of state doctrine because they do not interfere
with the governmental acts of a non-U.S. sovereign, but only
its purely commercial acts." 13 Like the commercial activity ex-
ception to the FSIA, this commercial activity exception allows
the courts to adjudicate cases where the sovereign act in ques-
tion is commercial, not governmental." 4
d. The Extraterritorial Exception
Under the extraterritorial exception, courts should not ap-
ply the act of state doctrine when the sovereign act has effects
outside the sovereign's jurisdiction that contravene the law
and policy of the United States." 5 This exception is an exten-
112. Id. at 695. The Court stated that "we are nevertheless persuaded ... that
the concept of an act of state should not be extended to include the repudiation of a
purely commercial obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its commer-
cial instrumentalities." Id.
113. Id. at 703-06; see Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d
1030, 1048 n.25 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that courts normally will not apply act of
state doctrine for purely commercial activity); see also Compania de Gas de Nuevo
Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1982) (recognizing commer-
cial activity exception, but holding that expropriation of gas line was governmental
and not commercial activity because performed for public interest), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1041 (1983).
114. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988) (allowing jurisdiction over non-U.S. sov-
ereign when acts involved in suit are commercial). The FSIA commercial activity
exception is jurisdictional, and will defeat a claim of sovereign immunity. Id. The act
of state doctrine commercial activity exception is discretionary, because the court in
its discretion can still apply the act of state doctrine even if the act is purely commer-
cial. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that though
price fixing of oil products by Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries had
commercial component, deference to executive and legislative branches is appropri-
ate in case involving Mideast "petropolitics"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). The
court stated that "[b]ecause the act of state doctrine and the doctrine of sovereign
immunity address different concerns and apply in different circumstances, we find
that the act of state doctrine remains available when such caution is appropriate,
regardless of any commercial component of the activity involved." Id. at 1360. See
generally Wolfe, supra note 15, at 317-18.
115. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516
(2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985). In this case, the situs of a debt was in
the United States and not Costa Rica. Therefore, the decree by Costa Rica expropri-
ating these funds was not shielded from judicial examination by the act of state doc-
trine because the property in question, the debt, was located outside the territory of
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sion of the reasoning in Sabbatino, in which the Court specifi-
cally limited the act of state doctrine to expropriations involv-
ing property located outside the United States." t 6 Although
the Court has not explicitly addressed the extraterritorial ex-
ception, it implicitly referred to this exception when it held
that the threshold for application of the act of state doctrine is
met when a court is faced with adjudicating the official act of a
sovereign performed within its own territory."' Thus, if the
extraterritorial effect of the sovereign's act reaches within the
United States and contravenes U.S. law and policy, courts nor-
mally will not apply the act of state doctrine." 8
II. TISMO v. M/V IPPOLYTOS: MANDATORY
JURISDICTION UNDER THE PENALTY WAGE
STATUTE AND THE ACT OF STATE
DOCTRINE
Recently, the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey, in Tismo v. M/V Ippolytos," 9 allowed the act of state
doctrine to supersede the mandatory jurisdiction of the pen-
alty wage statute. 2 ' Prior to Tismo, no court had ever been
faced with the issue of whether a bilateral agreement between
two non-U.S. sovereigns could supersede the mandatory juris-
Costa Rica. Id. The taking or expropriation, therefore, was not within the territory
of Costa Rica and therefore the act of state doctrine did not apply. Id. The appellate
court stated that "[a]cts of foreign governments purporting to have extraterritorial
effect-and consequently, by definition, falling outside the scope of the act of state
doctrine-should be recognized by the courts only if they are consistent with the law
and policy of the United States." Id. at 522; Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank,
353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965) (refusing to validate expropriation of property in United
States by Iraq, holding that to do so would violate U.S. policy against confiscation),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
116. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (limit-
ing its holding to cases where non-U.S. sovereign expropriates U.S. property located
within territory of non-U.S. sovereign).
117. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,
409 (1990). The Court held that "[t]he act of state doctrine does not establish an
exception for cases and controversies that may embarrass foreign governments, but
merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns taken
within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid." Id.
118. See, e.g., F. & H.R. Farman-Farmaian Consulting Eng'rs Firm v. Harza
Eng'g Co., 882 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1989) (allowing adjudication of suit under extrater-
ritorial exception to act of state doctrine to prevent seizure of assets in United
States), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3301 (1990).
119. 776 F. Supp. 928 (D.N.J.), aff'd mem., 947 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1991).
120. Id.
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diction of the penalty wage statute. 12 ' The court held that the
case met the act of state doctrine threshold because maintain-
ing jurisdiction would invalidate a provision of a bilateral
agreement between the Philippines and Cyprus. 122 Declining
to adjudicate the case, the court held that the policies underly-
ing the act of state doctrine were implicated to a greater de-
gree than those of the penalty wage statute.12 3 Through Tismo,
a court may have therefore finally given non-U.S. shipowners a
means to evade successfully the traditional mandatory jurisdic-
tion and admiralty protections provided for sailors by the pen-
alty wage statute.
A. Facts and Procedural History
In Tismo, the plaintiff sailors were Filipinos who signed
employment contracts to work on the Ippolytos, owned by the
private defendant, Outlook Shipping, Ltd., of Cyprus.' 24 The
parties negotiated, signed, and received approval for the em-
ployment contracts in the Philippines by the Philippine Over-
seas Employment Agency [hereinafter "POEA"].1 25 These
contracts granted original and exclusive jurisdiction to the
POEA and declared that Philippine law, international conven-
tions, treaties and covenants to which the Philippines was a sig-
natory would govern the contract. 26 The bilateral shipping
agreement between Cyprus and the Philippines also granted
original and exclusive jurisdiction over employment contract
disputes to the Philippines, the state where the contract was
signed and approved.12 7
The shipowner, Outlook Shipping, Ltd., and the General
Workers of Cyprus Union, an affiliate of the International
121. Id. at 931-32.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 932-33.
124. 776 F. Supp. 928, 929 (D.N.J.), aff'd mem., 947 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1991).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. The relevant provision of the bilateral agreement stated that
[a]ny disputes arising out of the respective contract of employment between
a shipowner of the one contracting Party and a seaman of the other Con-
tracting party shall be referred for settlement solely to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the competent Court or Authorities, as the case may be, in the coun-
try of the seaman's nationality where the contract of employment was signed
and approved.
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Transportation Workers Federation ("ITWF"), had concluded
a collective bargaining agreement.M This collective bargain-
ing agreement, circulated among the sailors on board, pro-
vided for higher wages than those provided by the sailors'
original POEA contract. 9  The Filipino sailors, who had
signed their employment contracts prior to this collective bar-
gaining agreement, read the collective bargaining agreement
containing the higher wages, and claimed that the captain
orally promised that the new wages applied to them as well as
the Cypriot sailors. 3 0
When the ship docked in Newark, New Jersey, plaintiffs
brought suit against the shipowner in rem and in personam for
failure to pay wages and repatriation expenses, and for the
penalty wages accrued under the penalty wage statute due to
refusal to pay back wages.' 3 ' The court granted the request to
seize and attach the vessel Ippolytos as security for the suit. 3 2
The ship was released when Outlook posted a US$200,000
bond for the ship, paid plaintiffs' wages under the POEA scale
and repatriation expenses, and agreed to a discovery sched-
ule.' 3 3  The sailors in turn stipulated that they received all
wages due under the POEA contract, that they were not mem-
bers of the Cyprus Union, and that they had not made a formal
demand for the collective bargaining agreement wages. 13
128. Id. at 929-30.
129. 776 F. Supp. 928, 930 (D.N.J.), aff'd mem., 947 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1991).
130. Id. at 929-30.
131. Id. The in rem jurisdiction was brought against the ship, Ippolytos, that was
seized in order to pay for the claims. The in personam jurisdiction was against the
shipowner, Outlook, Ltd. Id. at 930. Traditionally, sailors' wage claims have been so
highly regarded by courts that they have allowed sailors a maritime lien to be placed
on the vessel itself, in rem, as well as against the shipowner, in personam. Norris, supra
note 7, § 12:1, at 424-26. Black's Law Dictionary defines in ren jurisdiction as one
that "[r]efers to an action that is taken directly against the defendant's property. The
term may be contrasted with in personam jurisdiction. Power over a thing possessed
by a court which allows it to seize and hold the object for some legal purpose."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 794 (6th ed. 1990). Black's defines in personam jurisdiction
as "[p]ower which a court has over the defendant himself in contrast to the court's
power over the defendant's interest in property (quasi in ren) or power over the prop-
erty itself (in ren). A court which lacks personal jurisdiction is without power to issue
an in personam judgment." Id. at 791.
132. Tismo, 776 F. Supp. at 930.
133. Tismo v. M/Vlppolytos, 776 F. Supp. 928, 930 (D.Nj.), aff'd mem., 947 F.2d
937 (3d Cir. 1991).
134. Id.
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At trial, the parties presented the factual scenario of the
wage dispute.3 5 The plaintiff-sailors presented evidence that
the POEA admonished them for bringing the suit, and that
they had been blacklisted from employment as sailors for
bringing this suit and for contacting the ITWF.13 6 While the
defendant Outlook Shipping, Ltd. contended that the collec-
tive bargaining agreement only applied to the Cypriot sailors,
the Filipino sailors contended that they too should receive the
wage rate in the collective bargaining agreement, and
presented an affidavit from a Cyprus Union representative that
Outlook and the Union intended that the Filipino sailors re-
ceive payment according to the collective bargaining agree-
ment's wage rate." 7 Though the plaintiff Filipino sailors as-
serted that the captain of the Ippolytos orally promised them the
wage increase indicated in the agreement, they based their
claim on the collective bargaining agreement, not upon an oral
promise. 138
B. The Holding
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey ap-
plied the act of state doctrine based on the bilateral agreement
between Cyprus and the Philippines. 3 9 This agreement ex-
plicitly provided for original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
resolution of employment contract disputes involving ship-
owners and sailors of the two nations. 40 Although the court
did not discuss the threshold requirement that the official act
be performed within the sovereign's own territory, it held that
the defendant-shipowner had met the threshold for application
135. Id. at 929-33.
136. Id. at 932. See, e.g., Labor: Filipino Seamen Left To Sink Or Swim, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Jun. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (explaining
Philippine sailors' fear of being blacklisted for contacting union). Furthermore, the
ITWF blacklists ships that are noted for poor working conditions. See, e.g., Collision
Ship Was Blacked, NEWSPAPER PUBLISHING PLC: THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 14, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (explaining that ITWF had "blacked"
ship involved in collision for using flag of convenience and failing to sign collective
agreement).
137. Tismo v. MIVIppolytos, 776 F. Supp. 928, 930 (D.N.J.), aff'd mem., 947 F.2d
937 (3d Cir. 1991).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 932-36.
140. Id. at 929; see supra note 127 (quoting section of agreement on merchant
shipping containing forum selection provision for disputes).
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of the act of state doctrine because the validity of the official
act of a non-U.S. sovereign was directly in issue before the
court.' 4 ' The court did not completely defer, however, to the
jurisdictional choices of the Philippine and Cypriot sover-
eigns.' 4 2 Instead, the court stressed that it would entertain ap-
plications to reopen the case should the plaintiffs not receive a
fair hearing in the non-U.S. forum.' 4
Having found that the threshold for application of the
doctrine was met, the court considered the purposes of the act
of state doctrine and the penalty wage statute in light of the
facts in Tismo. 144 It held that the purposes of the act of state
141. Tismo v. M/V Ippolytos, 776 F. Supp. 928, 932-33 (D.NJ.), aff'd mem., 947
F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1991). The court, quoting Kirkpatrick, stated that
"[c]ourts in the United States have the power, and ordinarily the obligation,
to decide cases and controversies properly presented to them. The act of
state doctrine does not establish an exception for cases and controversies
that may embarrass foreign governments, but merely requires that, in the
process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own
jurisdictions shall be deemed valid." . . . The factual predicate for applica-
tion of the act of state doctrine is an official act of a foreign sovereign....
"[i]n every case in which we have held the act of state doctrine applicable,
the relief sought or the defense would have required a court in the United
States to declare invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign performed
within its own territory."
Id. (quoting W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400,
405, 409 (1990)).
142. Id. at 935-36. The court retained limited jurisdiction over the US$200,000
bond and stated that it would entertain motions to reopen the case if the plaintiffs did
not receive a fair hearing in the foreign forum. Id. The court stated that
[a]lthough this court will not assume the function of a court of appeal for
any final disposition obtained abroad, it will at least entertain any future
application to reopen this matter should any foreign decision or proceeding
be so devoid of due process or fundamental fairness that it does not warrant
recognition in this Court. Accordingly, the present action is stayed pursuant
to the terms set forth in the Order which accompanies this Opinion.
Id. at 935. The Order stated that "[t]his court retains limited jurisdiction to adminis-
ter the $200,000.00 fund generated for purposes of releasing the M/V Ippolytos and
to entertain applications, if any, to reopen this matter upon final disposition of plain-
tiffs' claims in the appropriate foreign forum." Id. at 936.
143. Id. at 934-35.
144. See id. at 933. The court commented that
[t]his case squarely places the issue before the Court whether the
'mandatory' jurisdiction (if applicable) under the wage penalty statute is su-
perseded by the act of state doctrine. In this case, the Court finds that the
policies underlying the act of state doctrine are implicated to a greater de-
gree than those implicated by the wage penalty statute. Accordingly, this
Court will apply the act of state doctrine and direct the plaintiffs to litigate
their claims in an appropriate forum in either Cyprus or The Philippines.
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doctrine, i.e., deference to both the executive and to the offi-
cial acts of non-U.S. sovereigns, outweighed the policies of the
penalty wage statute.1 45 The court acknowledged affidavits
from the former Labor Attach6 of the Government of the Phil-
ippines for the United States and the Director of Merchant
Shipping and the Registrar of Cyprus Ships as evidence of the
desire of the two governments to have their agreement
honored and the matter adjudicated in the Philippines. 14 6
Although the court recognized that these declarations of policy
by non-U.S. governments cannot bind U.S. courts, it found
them to be strong evidence that asserting jurisdiction over
these claims would invalidate a treaty provision and implicate a
politically sensitive matter.'
47
The court asserted that the general policies behind the
penalty wage statute were absent in this case.'14  The court did
not need to protect sailors from victimization by the shipown-
ers because the sailors were paid the wages they agreed to
under their POEA employment contracts. 49 Similarly, the
court did not need to protect port states from the burden of
caring for unpaid sailors because the sailors were repatriated
to the Philippines and had the opportunity to return to the
U.S. court if unfairly treated in the Philippine forum. 50 Fi-
nally, the court asserted that no evidence was presented to it
that this case furthered the penalty wage statute policy of pro-
moting the employment of U.S. sailors.' 5 ' The court thus held
that the policies underlying the penalty wage statute were not
Id.
145. See id. at 933-34 (commenting that act of state doctrine is used to avoid
judiciary determining validity of acts of non-U.S. states within their own territory).
The court stated that "the treaty between Cyprus and the Philippines ... would be
rendered invalid if this court assumes jurisdiction. The governments of each of these
nations has made the affirmative decision as to dispute resolution, and the Court
should not seek to nullify this decision." Id.
146. Tismo v. M/VIppolytos, 776 F. Supp. 928, 934 (D.Nj.), aff'd mem., 947 F.2d
937 (3d Cir. 1991).
147. See id. at 934 n.2. The court commented that the affidavits of the Philip-
pine and Cypriot representatives constituted evidence that the act of state doctrine
was implicated. Id. The court recognized, however, that it was by no means bound
by these statements. Id.
148. Id. at 933-34.
149. Id. at 934.
150. Id. at 934-35.
151. Tismo v. M/Vl ppolytos, 776 F. Supp. 928, 934 (D.Nj.), aff'd mem., 947 F.2d
937 (3d Cir. 1991).
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present, or at least not important enough to supersede the bi-
lateral agreement between Cyprus and the Philippines. 52
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
this decision without opinion.15' The courts traditionally have
jealously guarded sailors' mandatory right to a U.S. forum
under the penalty wage statute and have not allowed any
method such as forum selection clauses or assertions of juris-
diction by non-U.S. labor agencies to avoid its mandatory juris-
diction.' 54 The Third Circuit in Tismo, under the rubric of the
act of state doctrine, recognized the validity of such clauses
and assertions, however, because they were contained in a bi-
lateral agreement.' 55 The court in Tismo thus may have pro-
vided non-U.S. shipowners with a means of avoiding the net-
tlesome mandatory jurisdiction of the penalty wage statute.
III. TISMO: THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE SHOULD NOT
SUPERSEDE THE PENALTY WAGE STATUTE'S
MANDA TOR YJURISDICTION
The Third Circuit in Tismo should not have applied the act
of state doctrine to avoid the mandatory jurisdiction of the
penalty wage statute. The case did not meet the threshold for
application of the doctrine, and both the Sabbatino balancing
factors and the exceptions to the doctrine demonstrate that the
doctrine should not have been applied in these circumstances.
U.S. courts consistently have refused to allow non-U.S. sailors
to negotiate away their right, granted by Congress, to access to
the U.S. courts under the penalty wage statute. Because Con-
gress specifically intended the statute to apply to non-U.S
152. Id. at 933-35.
153. Tismo v. M/vIppolytos, 776 F. Supp. 928 (D.NJ.), aff'd mem., 947 F.2d 937
(3d Cir. 1991). The court retained jurisdiction over the bond to ensure that the
plaintiff-sailors received a hearing before the POEA. Id. at 935. The court stated
that
[a]s expressed at oral argument, however, if plaintiffs' rights under Philip-
pine or Cypriot laws, contracts or treaties are patently ignored or abused in
the foreign forum, the significance of their right of access to this Court
under 46 U.S.C. § 10313 would escalate considerably. In essence, this
Court is according comity to the nations of Cyprus and The Philippines in
the expectation that the plaintiffs will receive a fair hearing, whatever its
result may be.
Id.
154. Id. at 930-35.
155. Id.
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sailors and shipowners, the court, given this positive direction
from Congress, should have adjudicated the case. Further-
more, international law does not require the United States to
respect a treaty or bilateral agreement to which it is not a
party. The court should therefore not have applied the act of
state doctrine and given effect to a bilateral agreement to
which the United States is not a party and which contravenes
the U.S. statute that protects such a traditional right as the
wage claims of sailors. 1
56
A. The Court in Tismo Should Not Have Applied the
Act of State Doctrine
The court should not have applied the act of state doctrine
for several reasons. First, the execution of the Philippine-Cyp-
riot bilateral agreement, although an official act, has ramifica-
tions beyond the sovereign's territory and thus did not satisfy
the threshold requirement of the act of state doctrine. Second,
application of the Sabbatino factors indicates that the court
should not have declined to adjudicate the case because the
issue is not a politically sensitive dispute involving uncharted
areas of international law. Third, the circumstances of the case
fell within the extraterritorial and the commercial activity ex-
ceptions to the act of state doctrine.
1. The Threshold for Application of the Act of State
Doctrine is Absent
The threshold for application of the act of state doctrine is
not present in Tismo.' 57 The Supreme Court recently declared
156. See Castillo v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 937 F.2d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 1991)
(scrutinizing releases obtained in Philippines to ensure that no duress or force was
used to obtain them). Castillo, in essence, reiterates the diligence the courts will use
to protect sailors. Id. The court stated that
[s]eamen, as wards of the court, are entitled to a careful review when a dis-
trict court refuses to exercise jurisdiction over their claims. We are con-
vinced that federal courts must remain vigilant in protecting the rights of
seamen, whether foreign or domestic, in their relations with their employer.
This protection comports with our nations' long history of concern and so-
licitude for seamen with employment disputes. The settlement of wage dis-
putes between shipowners and seamen must be closely scrutinized.
Id. at 247.
157. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S.
400, 405, 409 (1990) (stating that factual predicate for application of act of state
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that courts may only apply the act of state doctrine when con-
fronted with the issue of the validity of an official act of a non-
U.S. sovereign performed within its own territory. 158 The exe-
cution of a bilateral agreement is an official act of a non-U.S.
sovereign, but it is not performed within the territory of the
sovereign.' 59 Rather, because the exclusive jurisdiction provi-
sion of the Philippine-Cypriot bilateral agreement acts to deny
the rights of these states' sailors in other sovereigns' jurisdic-
tions and territories, the agreement is therefore effectively per-
formed outside Philippine and Cypriot territory. 60 The bilat-
eral agreement in Tismo denies the plaintiff-sailors their right
under the penalty wage statute to access to the U.S. courts for
a cause of action arising in the United States.16' Due to this
extraterritorial scope of the agreement, Tismo therefore does
not meet the threshold or factual predicate for application of
the act of state doctrine. The Third Circuit thus should not
have applied the act of state doctrine. 6
2
doctrine is that court must determine validity of official act of non-U.S. sovereign
performed within its own territory).
158. Id.
159. Id. Justice Scalia stated in Kirkpatrick that "[iun every case in which we have
held the act of state doctrine applicable, the relief sought or the defense interposed
would have required a court in the United States to declare invalid the official act of a
foreign sovereign performed within its own territory." Id. at 405.
160. Cf Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (stating
that it was limiting its holding to official acts of non-U.S. sovereigns that expropriate
property within their own territories); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.) (stating that even though official decree of expropri-
ation was performed within Costa Rica, act of state doctrine could not be used to
prevent adjudication because property expropriated was located within United
States), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985). Therefore, even though the treaty docu-
ment itself may have been executed in the Philippines, Cyprus, or at some neutral
site, just as this expropriation decree in Allied Bank was issued within the sovereign's
territory, the United States should not apply the act of state doctrine when the official
act affects property or activities within the United States. The only provision of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties relating to this issue of the location of the
treaty merely states that a treaty is binding on parties as to their entire territory un-
less otherwise expressed. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force
Jan. 27, 1980, art. 29, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (1980), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 691
(1969).
161. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(i) (1988).
162. Tismo v. M/VIppolytos, 776 F. Supp. 928 (D.NJ.), aff'dmem., 947 F.2d 937
(3d Cir. 1991); see W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S.
400, 405-09 (1991) (emphasizing that act of state doctrine has only been applied
when court is faced with validity of official acts taken within non-U.S. sovereign's
territory or jurisdiction).
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2. The Sabbatino Factors Are Absent
An evaluation of the balancing factors pronounced in Sab-
batino also suggest that the Third Circuit should not have ap-
plied the act of state doctrine. 63  Under Sabbatino, courts
should consider the degree of codification of international law,
the continuing existence of the non-U.S. sovereign state, and
the political nature or sensitivity of the situation."6
In Tismo, the Sabbatino factors have limited importance. 165
The first factor, the degree of codification of international law,
is not critical because there are no complex, sensitive, and un-
chartered areas of international law to be explored in Tismo as
there were in Sabbatino.'6 6 The provision of the penalty wage
statute that grants non-U.S. sailors access to U.S. courts ap-
plies only when the vessels are in U.S. harbors. 6 7 The vessels
are therefore in U.S. internal waters which are part of the terri-
tory of the United States and thus subject to her jurisdiction
according to international law.' 68  The Supreme Court has
held that Congress possessed the constitutional authority to
enact such statutes controlling the employment conditions of
sailors on board ships that enjoy access to U.S. ports. 6 9 Thus,
163. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428 (stating general factors to be evaluated in
deciding whether act of state doctrine applied).
164. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
165. Id.; Tismo v. M/Vlppolytos, 776 F. Supp. 928 (D.NJ.), aff'd mem., 947 F.2d
937 (3d Cir. 1991).
166. See Tismo, 776 F. Supp. at 934 n.2 (recognizing that it was not at all bound
to defer to exclusive jurisdiction provision of Cypriot-Filipino agreement); see also
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428 (commenting that there was no codified or tangible body of
international law governing expropriations of property with which to adjudicate such
politically sensitive, international case).
167. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(i) (1988).
168. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29,
1958, art. 1-19, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1608-12 (1958), T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S.
205, 206-219 (1964); see J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 195-96
(1976) (stating that ports are normally part of state territory for statute jurisdiction).
Starke states that "[tihe general rule is that a merchant vessel enters the port of a
foreign state subject to the local jurisdiction. The derogations from this rule depend
on the practice followed by each state." Id. at 195. Cf Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1
(1887) (holding that, in criminal cases, though it is customary for merchant vessels to
subject themselves to the laws of port states, the United States would normally exer-
cise jurisdiction unless the peace of the port is threatened). International law there-
fore places no restrictions on the ability of Congress and the courts to allow this
jurisdiction for wage claims under the penalty wage statute.
169. See Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348, 356 (1920) (holding that
Congress has authority to enact such statute). Justice Day stated that
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because Congress had the authority according to the U.S. Con-
stitution and international law to apply the penalty wage stat-
ute to non-U.S. sailors and shipowners enjoying access to U.S.
ports, this exercise of jurisdiction is not a new and sensitive
issue in international law.'7 ° Rather, the statute at issue per-
tains to the domestic issue of regulating commercial activity in
U.S. harbors. 7 ' This factor for applying the act of state doc-
trine was therefore weak.' 72
The second Sabbatino factor, the continuing existence of
the states of Cyprus and the Philippines, though perhaps rele-
vant, is not dispositive. 7 3 Because the governments of Cyprus
and the Philippines that agreed to this bilateral agreement still
exist, the political sensitivity of the matter is greater than if
they did not still exist.' 74 Although these governments do still
exist, this factor is not controlling because the mere continued
we have no doubt as to the authority of Congress to pass a statute of this
sort, applicable to foreign vessels in our ports and controlling the employ-
ment and payment of seamen as a condition of the right of such foreign
vessels to enter and use the ports of the United States.
Id.
170. See Boureslan v. Arabian Amer. Oil Co., Ill S. Ct. 1227 (1991) (holding
that Congress can overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of
statutes by expressing such intent); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353
U.S. 138, 142-43 (1957) (holding that Congress could have chosen to make Labor
Management Relations Act applicable to non-U.S. ships and sailors when in U.S. wa-
ters by expressing such intent). The Court stated that
[i]t is beyond question that a ship voluntarily entering the territorial limits of
another country subjects itself to the laws and jurisdiction of that coun-
try.... It follows that if Congress had so chosen, it could have made the Act
applicable to wage disputes arising on foreign vessels between nationals of
other countries when the vessel comes within our territorial waters. The
question here therefore narrows to one of intent of Congress as to the cov-
erage of the Act.
Id. at 142.
171. Benz, 353 U.S. at 142-43; 46 U.S.C. § 10313(i) (1988).
172. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964). Tismo v.
M/V Ippolytos, 776 F. Supp. 928 (D.N.J.), aff'd mem., 947 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1991).
173. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428 (commenting that if government that per-
formed act in question is no longer in existence, act of state doctrine may have less
weighty implications); see also Republic of Phil. v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, .1360-61
(9th Cir.) (commenting that when challenged acts were by non-U.S. sovereign no
longer in power, issue of continuing existence of non-U.S. sovereign is relevant, but
not dispositive), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1988).
174. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. The Court stated that "[tihe balance of relevant
considerations may also be shifted if the government which perpetrated the chal-
lenged act of state is no longer in existence, as in the Bernstein case, for the political
interest of this country may, as a result, be measurably altered." Id.
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existence of the non-U.S. sovereign itself does not, by itself,
raise politically sensitive questions sufficient to merit applica-
tion of the act of state doctrine. 75
The third factor, interference with the executive, is also
not prominent in Tismo because adjudicating the case would
not interfere with the executive's ability to conduct foreign re-
lations. 176 The executive signed the penalty wage statute into
law, and thus should be bound by it.177 Correspondingly, the
United States is not a party to the Philippine-Cypriot bilateral
agreement, and likewise should not be bound by it.' 78 The
novel and crucial international and political issues of commu-
nism, lost foreign investments, nationalization and expropria-
tion of U.S. property that were grounds for deferral to the ex-
ecutive in other act of state doctrine cases are not present in
Tismo because there is no dispute over whether Congress has
the right under international law to pass such statutes, or
whether the U.S. courts may disregard a treaty or bilateral
agreement to which it is not a party. 79 Furthermore, the sub-
175. See Marcos, 862 F.2d at 1360-61 (commenting that when challenged acts
were by non-U.S. sovereign no longer in power, issue of continuing existence of non-
U.S. sovereign is relevant, but not dispositive).
176. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428 (stating that certain issues involve politically
sensitive international issues more than others, and courts must be aware of this).
The Court stated that "[iut is also evident that some aspects of international law
touch much more sharply on national nerves than do others; the less important the
implications of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for
exclusivity in the political branches." Id.
177. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
178. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 160, art. 34-38, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 341, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 693-94 (1969). These articles state that a
treaty creates no obligations or rights for a third party state without its consent.
179. Tismo v. M/Vlppolytos, 776 F. Supp. 928 (D.NJ), aff'd mer., 947 F.2d 937
(3d Cir. 1991); see, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v.
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding that court will decline to examine OPEC's oil price control systems under
federal antitrust laws on basis of act of state doctrine), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163
(1982). The court deferred to the legislative and executive branches to deal with the
very complex international and economic issues raised by OPEC's activity. Id. The
court stated that
[tihe political branches of our government are able to consider the compet-
ing economic and political considerations and respond to the public will in
order to carry on foreign relations in accordance with the best interests of
the country as a whole .... The act of state doctrine ... requires that the
courts defer to the legislative and executive branches when those branches
are better equipped to resolve a politically sensitive question.
Id. at 1358. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text (stating that Congress has
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stantive issue of ensuring the payment of sailors dates back to
ancient times, and thus cannot be called an issue requiring ex-
pedient executive attention. 80 Though the court avers that
the affidavits from non-U.S. labor officials are strong evidence
of the political sensitivity of the matter, the U.S. executive
branch has not indicated its concern for the sensitivity of this
issue. 8 ' This third Sabbatino factor is therefore also unimpor-
tant because adjudicating the case would not constitute unwar-
ranted interference with the foreign policy prerogatives of the
executive branch.' 82 The Third Circuit should therefore not
have applied the act of state doctrine in Tismo because the
three Sabbatino factors were not prominent.
3. Exceptions to the Act of State Doctrine
The court also should have rejected the application of the
act of state doctrine by utilizing the exceptions to the doctrine.
The cause of action in Tismo arises from a commercial activity
occurring outside the sovereign states' territory. 13 The facts
in Tismo therefore apply more appropriately to the extraterrito-
rial and commercial activity exceptions of the act of state doc-
trine than to the doctrine itself.
a. Extraterritoriality of the Treaty Provision
The court should have rejected application of the act of
state doctrine under the extraterritorial exception. The exclu-
sive jurisdiction provision of the bilateral agreement involves
extraterritorial effects in the United States that contravene U.S.
the right under international law to pass such statutes regulating use of U.S. harbors,
and that U.S. courts have the ability to disregard treaties to which the U.S. is not a
party).
180. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text (describing longstanding admi-
ralty policy of ensuring payment for sailors).
181. Tismo, 776 F. Supp. at 934 (commenting that affidavits present evidence
that act of state doctrine is implicated). The court, however, recognizes that it is not
bound by these affidavits. Id. at 934 n.2.
182. Id.
183. See supra notes 97-118 and accompanying text (explaining relevant excep-
tions to act of state doctrine). The Bernstein exception does not apply because the
executive did not inform the court of its position on the matter. See supra notes 103-
05 and accompanying text (explaining Bernstein exception). The treaty exception also
does not apply because the agreement does not supply controlling legal principles on
which to adjudicate the case. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text (explain-
ing treaty exception).
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law and policy. 18 4 Allowing this bilateral agreement to super-
sede the penalty wage statute's mandatory jurisdiction for non-
U.S. sailors contravenes the policies of the statute, namely, to
ensure the payment of sailors' wages, to protect the port states
from the burden of caring for unpaid sailors, and to equalize
the wages of U.S. and non-U.S. sailors. 85 Therefore, because
the forum selection provision of the Philippine and Cypriot bi-
lateral agreement has the extraterritorial effect of reaching
within U.S. harbors and directly contravening the long-stand-
ing U.S. admiralty law and policy of protecting the payment of
sailors by granting mandatory access to non-U.S. sailors for
wage claims, the court should not have applied the act of state
doctrine under the extraterritorial exception.' 86
b. The Commercial Activity Exception
The act of state doctrine also should not apply in Tismo
because execution of bilateral agreements by sovereigns may
fit under the commercial activity exception."" Though execu-
tion of a bilateral agreement constitutes an official act of a non-
U.S. sovereign, the applicable portion of the agreement gov-
erns only private commercial disputes, and therefore can be
construed as governing purely commercial activity.' 8 8 Further-
more, because the penalty wage claim fits within the commer-
184. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516
(2d Cir.) (holding that expropriation by Costa Rica was not shielded by the act of
state doctrine because money being expropriated could be construed as existing in
United States), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985). The court held that because the
situs of the debt was in the United States the expropriation of that sum by Costa Rica
was not performed within its own territory. Id. The court stated that "[a]cts of for-
eign governments purporting to have extraterritorial effect-and consequently, by
definition, falling outside the scope of the act of state doctrine-should be recog-
nized by the courts only if they are consistent with the law and policy of the United
States." Id. at 522; Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir.
1965) (refusing to validate expropriation of property in United States by Iraq, hold-
ing that to do so would violate U.S. policy against confiscation), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
1027 (1966).
185. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text (explaining courts' and Con-
gressional policies behind penalty wage statute).
186. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text (explaining courts' and Con-
gressional policies behind penalty wage statute).
187. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
(1974) (holding by four justice plurality that act of state doctrine should not be ap-
plied when non-U.S. sovereign engages in purely commercial activity).
188. Id.; Tismo v. M/Vlppolytos, 776 F. Supp. 928, 929 (D.NJ), aff'd mem., 947
F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1991).
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cial activity exception of the FSIA, a penalty wage claim should
also be considered a commercial activity under the act of state
doctrine. '89
If the court concluded that the commercial activity had
broader governmental functions, however, the commercial ac-
tivity exception might not apply. 90 According to news re-
ports, for example, the Philippine government and the POEA
control the wages of Filipino sailors to make the sailors more
employable by the world's shipowners.' 9t If the court con-
cluded that this provision of the agreement had the broader
governmental purpose of helping the employment prospects
of the Filipino sailors, the commercial activity exception might
not have applied.' The Philippines, however, seems to be
fulfilling this purpose through the exploitation of its own citi-
zens by attempting to deprive them of their admiralty rights
under U.S. law. 93 The courts should therefore not view this
provision of the bilateral agreement as one supporting the
public interest. 94
189. See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 698-706 (asserting that FSIA and act of state doc-
trine commercial activity exceptions are interrelated); see also Velidor v. L/P/G Ben-
ghazi, 647 F. Supp. 246 (S.D. Ala. 1977) (holding that FSIA did not protect non-U.S.
sovereign shipowner from liability under penalty wage statute because owning ship
that used U.S. ports where claim arose fell under commercial activity exception). But
see International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Pe-
troleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that courts can
apply act of state doctrine when commercial activity would be sufficient for jurisdic-
tion under FSIA), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
190. See Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322,
326 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that, although Mexican government expropriated equip-
ment of U.S. gas company operating in Mexico, purpose was not commercial but
governmental because government had expropriated gas line to supply its people
with gas), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983).
191. R.P. To Send Mission to Japan on Seamen Issue, KYODO NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 5,
1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, All File. The Philippines Labor Minister,
Bias Opal, went on a "goodwill mission" to Japan concerning the very low wages that
Filipino sailors receive when Japan threatened to boycott ships manned by Filipino
sailors. Id. The POEA administrator, when asked why wages for Filipino sailors were
so low, commented that the "[I]ower wage rate is our only selling point." Id. The
Labor Minister also commented that there were 54,000 Filipino sailors who brought
US$250 million into the Philippines annually. Id. See Cruz v. Chesapeake Shipping,
Inc., 932 F.2d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that the POEA requires that 80% of
wages paid to sailors during overseas employment be repatriated home to the Philip-
pines).
192. KYODO NEWS SERVICE, supra note 191.
193. Id.
194. See Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, 686 F.2d at 326 (holding that expropri-
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B. Implications of Tismo 's Use of the Act of State Doctrine
Tismo was an improper application of the act of state doc-
trine because the court allowed a treaty between two non-U.S.
sovereigns to take effect in the United States in contravention
of a U.S. statute and court holdings that require mandatory ju-
risdiction for sailors' wage claims. Neither the international
law on treaties, nor the international law concerning internal
waters and ports required such deference. '9  The principal
cases on the act of state doctrine emphasized the right of non-
U.S. sovereigns to exercise their power in their own territories,
and the prudence of deferring to the executive branch a novel
or politically crucial issue that it was better equipped to han-
dle. "'9 6 The circumstances surrounding Tismo present neither
of these situations, because the non-U.S. sovereigns are exer-
cising power within U.S. ports by disallowing suits for wages,
and because allowing such suits and protecting sailors is a
traditional and longstanding aspect of U.S. admiralty law.' 97
Tismo also undermines the policies of the penalty wage statute
by attempting to deprive sailors of their rights to collect wages
while in U.S. ports. Congress intended the penalty wage stat-
ute to ensure the prompt payment of sailors' wages, to protect
the port states from the burden of caring for unpaid sailors,
and to equalize the wages of U.S. and non-U.S. sailors.' 98
Congress and the courts furthered these policies by extending
the protection of the penalty wage statute to non-U.S. sailors
and granting them mandatory access to U.S. courts. 99
The policies behind mandatory jurisdiction arise from the
need to protect sailors because of their vulnerable position.20 0
Though the court in Tismo does not describe the pay and work-
ation of gas lines was not commercial activity under act of state doctrine because it
was done for public benefit of citizens).
195. See supra notes 168-72, 178 and accompanying text (asserting that U.S. is
not required to defer to this treaty).
196. See supra notes 70-96 (describing bases of the act of state doctrine).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 1-12, 19-68 (explaining the aggressive
stance U.S. courts have taken on maintaining this jurisdiction).
198. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text (explaining policies behind
penalty wage statute).
199. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(i) (1988); Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348
(1920).
200. See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text (explaining policies behind
mandatory jurisdiction for non-U.S. sailors under penalty wage statute).
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ing conditions of the plaintiff-sailors, other cases illustrate the
exploitation of sailors that Congress and the U.S. courts have
attempted to ameliorate through the penalty wage statute.20 '
The statute prevents shipowners from practicing fraud and
double-bookkeeping in paying sailors, and from blacklisting
sailors who bring wage claims in U.S. courts.2 °2 The statute
also protects sailors from duress and fraud in negotiating re-
leases of their wage claims by allowing courts to set aside such
releases. 20 3 To effectuate the statute's protection, U.S. courts
201. See, e.g., Raby v. M/V Pine Forest, 1990 A.M.C. 2441 (W.D. Wa. 1990), rev'd
in part, 918 F.2d 80 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2015 (1991). The court
asserted jurisdiction over wage claims brought by Filipino sailors against the Japa-
nese managers of the Republic of Vanuatu flag ship, Pine Forest. Id. at 2443-44. The
managers kept two sets of books indicating the wages paid to the sailors. Id. One
indicated the low wage rate according to the Japan Shipping Union [hereinafter
JSU]/Associated Marine Officers and Seamen's Union of the Philippines [hereinafter
AMOSUP] collective bargaining agreement, and another false set indicated wages in
conformance with the ITWF collective bargaining agreement wage rates. Id. The
plaintiff-sailors received the pay they originally agreed to, but signed for the ITWF
level wages on receipt. Id. When the plaintiff sailors made the demand for these
ITWF wages, they were repatriated to the Philippines and blacklisted from new em-
ployment as sailors due to their wage demand. Id. The court awarded US$32.5 mil-
lion to the plaintiffs, based on their wage claims, damages for loss of future income,
punitive damages, emotional distress, interest, costs, and attorney's fees, while the
total wage claims would have been approximately US$166,000. Id. at 2447-50. The
court, impressed by the bad faith exploitation of these sailors, found jurisdiction
under both the federal admiralty jurisdiction in article III of the Constitution, and
under 46 U.S.C. § 10313(i) (1988). Id. at 2447. The court stated that
[t]he conduct by the defendants at all times relevant herein was intentional,
deliberate, reckless, callous, flagrant, malicious, indifferent, and uncon-
scionable; that such conduct by the defendants was to intimidate, coerce and
punish the plaintiffs; that such conduct was in complete disregard of the
plaintiffs' rights; and that defendants' conduct at all times relevant herein
violates the laws and public policy of the United States. The plaintiffs herein
are entitled under statute and general maritime law of the United States to
the protection of the courts.
Id. at 2446. The Ninth Circuit reduced the amount of the bond on appeal. Raby, 918
F.2d at 80.
202. Cf U.S. Judge to Heavily PunishJapanese Firm in Seamen's Pay Dispute, UPI, July
14, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI file. The shipowners in Raby saved
over US$400,000 per year on this double bookkeeping practice and practiced it on all
ten of their ships. Id. The defendant shipowners admitted this practice and con-
tended that it was widespread in the industry. Id.
203. See 46 U.S.C. § 10313(e) (1988) (stating that courts may set aside releases
of wage claims in the interest ofjustice); Castillo v. Spiliada Maritime Corp., 937 F.2d
240 (5th Cir. 1991). On bringing a suit for their contracted wages, the plaintiffs in
Castillo were discharged, repatriated to the Philippines, and blacklisted. Castillo, 937
F.2d at 243. Before bringing the suit, the plaintiffs executed a release of their penalty
wage claim while in the Philippines. Id. at 243-44. The court of appeals held that the
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should therefore maintain their mandatory jurisdiction, refus-
ing to defer these cases to forums less sympathetic to sailors'
rights.2 °4
In Tismo, the court treated lightly these policies of the pen-
alty wage statute and deferred jurisdiction, holding that the
policies of the act of state doctrine were implicated more
strongly.205 The court asserted that because the sailors were
paid their substandard POEA wages and they have been repa-
triated to the Philippines, the policies of the penalty wage stat-
ute were satisfied. 0 6 The court also held that the policy of aid-
ing the employment of U.S. sailors was not relevant because
the plaintiffs did not present evidence that upholding jurisdic-
tion in this case would further this purpose.20 7 The court
neither addressed the evidence of blacklisting, nor examined
the merits of the claim for higher wages under the collective
bargaining agreement.2 0
The precedent set by the Third Circuit in Tismo is there-
fore improper because it permits a bilateral agreement con-
taining a forum selection clause to sanction these abuses that
the penalty wage statute was explicitly designed to protect.2 0 9
Under Tismo, the nations of the sailors can abrogate the U.S.
penalty wage statute admiralty rights of their citizens and use
the act of state doctrine to insulate themselves from liability in
releases should be set aside despite claims of validity under Philippine law. Id. The
court set aside the releases because a significant language barrier existed between the
sailors and the shipowners' agents during negotiations, there were threats to blacklist
and file charges against the sailors with the POEA, and neither the counsel advising
the sailors nor the sailors themselves were aware of the remedy available to them in
the United States under the penalty wage statute. Id. at 244-48. The court focused
on determining whether the plaintiffs' release was just and in conformance with the
penalty wage statute. Id.
204. See R.P. to Send Mission to Japan on Seamen Issue, KYoDo NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 5,
1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, All file (explaining POEA's pro-shipowner
attitude in allowing Filipino sailors to work for substandard wages). The attitude of
the POEA therefore does not seem to be one adamant in protecting its sailors, but
rather exploitive. Id. The POEA does not seem supportive of its sailors when they
bring suit in the United States, as the evidence presented by the sailors in Tismo
reveals. Tismo v. M/Vlppolytos, 776 F. Supp. 928, 931 (D.N.J. 1990), aff'd mem., 947
F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1991).
205. Tismo, 776 F. Supp. at 931-33.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 930-31.
209. Tismo v. MIVIppolytos, 776 F. Supp. 928 (D.N.J.), aff'd mem., 947 F.2d 937
(3d Cir. 1991).
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U.S. courts. Non-U.S. governments can sanction the un-
derpayment, fraud, abuse, and mistreatment suffered by non-
U.S. sailors while the act of state doctrine eliminates the
sailor's access to redress in the U.S. courts.2 °
CONCLUSION
The U.S. judiciary should not allow governments to cir-
cumvent the traditional protection for sailors mandated by the
penalty wage statute. The U.S. courts are not bound by any
treaty provision to which the United States is not a party, and
international law allows the U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction
over non-U.S. vessels using U.S. harbors and internal waters.
Courts should therefore treat forum selection provisions of bi-
lateral agreements as they do private contractual forum selec-
tions clauses and refuse to allow them to circumvent U.S. juris-
diction. If the courts allow non-U.S. sovereigns to evade U.S.
jurisdiction, shipowners may have an opportunity to overcome
admiralty's traditional wage protection for sailors by influenc-
ing their governments to add similar forum selection clauses to
bilateral agreements. Courts should not allow the act of state
doctrine to be used to strip these sailors of their traditional
mandatory access to the U.S. courts, which may be the only
courts open to them.
Edward JDonahue, Jr. *
210. Patrice O'Shaughnessy and James Rosen, Tanker Crew Wins Bayonne Fight,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, February 12, 1992, at 2, col. 2. A recent near mutiny occurred in
New Jersey, part of the Third Circuit where Tismo was decided. Id. The uprising of
the mostly Egyptian crew of the Maltese-flag Prime Noble was only averted when the
Bayonne, NewJersey Police Chief supervised negotiations where the shipowners paid
over US$100,000 in back wages, took on fresh drinking water and acceptable food,
and agreed to provide clean showers and toilets for the crew. Id.
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